Benchmarking Parliamentary Administration: The United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia
Bibliographic record
Abstract
There is a growing assumption that where corporate governance has been introduced into the administration of parliament, there is evidence that parliament is better able to assert its independence of the executive and ensure that adequate resources to assist it to hold the government to account are made available. The paper examines this proposition in the case of the parliaments of the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. It demonstrates that the introduction of corporate governance in these parliaments has, for the most part, been partial and has not improved the power of parliaments over their purse. It suggests that budgetary independence is less likely to result from legislation than from a culture which accepts that a parliament gets the resources it needs to do its job. It raises questions about speakers, who as members of the governing party inevitably are compromised in their capacity to champion the parliament. And it raises questions about the accountability of CEOs of the parliamentary administration to speakers where speakers do not enjoy the support of an effective governance machinery in the form of a commission of members of parliament from across the political spectrum. # This paper has been fully double blind refereed to full academic standards. The paper was first delivered with the title ‘What kind of parliamentary administrative arrangements are more likely to contribute to a parliament’s independence and its capacity to hold the executive to account? Some preliminary findings from an analysis of the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia’, at the Australasian Study of Parliament Group Annual Conference in Wellington, New Zealand, in September 2006. Since then it has benefited considerably from comment from colleagues and feedback from officials in the four parliaments concerned — and I thank them. Thanks are also due to Merrindahl Andrew for assistance with the organisation charts. * Dr June Verrier is a Visiting Fellow, Democratic Audit, ANU 46 June Verrier APR 22(1)
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".