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Record W2245940423

Compliance and Administrative Costs of Taxation in Canada

2007· article· en· W2245940423 on OpenAlex
François Vaillancourt, Jason Clemens, Milagros Palacios

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicCanadian Policy and Governance
Canadian institutionsLibrary of ParliamentUniversité de Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEarningsIncentiveTax deferralPublic economicsBusinessAppealOvertimeIncome taxEconomicsLabour economicsFinanceTax reformGross incomeState income taxMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

There are a number of economic costs associated with taxes, some of which unfortunately, are almost always ignored or misunderstood. The direct and most visible cost of taxes is simply the tax itself. It is the amount of earnings that individuals or businesses forego when they pay taxes. Put simply, an individual earns income but only receives a portion of it after paying for taxes. This is the direct cost of taxation: loss of income.Another cost of taxes — which is often recognized but frequently not taken sufficiently into account in public policy discussions — is the incentive effects of taxes. As noted above, taxes create a wedge between what individuals and businesses earn and what they actually receive for their efforts. The incentive costs from taxes are a result of changed behaviour and foregone opportunities. For example, workers might decide to work less overtime because they deem the reward (that is, extra earnings) insufficient to compensate them for the extra effort. Similarly, businesses might decide to forego expansion or investing in new businesses if the after-tax reward (adjusted for risk) is insufficient. In both these cases, society is less well off because of decisions that were made, in part, due to the effects of taxes.The costs associated with complying with the tax code are almost always ignored in public policy debates. Compliance costs include the time required to collect and organize receipts, accounting and other professional fees, the time required to complete tax forms if professionals are not used, appeal costs if applicable, and the general costs of remitting returns. Similarly, the administrative costs incurred by governments to administer and collect taxes are often ignored. In both cases, one explanation of this is the lack of quantitative estimates of these costs. This study will facilitate taking these costs into account.In 2011, between $19.2 billion and $24.8 billion was spent complying with the personal and business tax system in Canada. An additional $6.6 billion was collectively spent by governments across the country administering the tax system. Should Canada choose to embark on fundamental tax reform, this could reduce these costs by simplifying the tax system.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.757
Threshold uncertainty score0.171

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.053
GPT teacher head0.342
Teacher spread0.290 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations35
Published2007
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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