L'actionnaire et l'entreprise insolvable (Shareholders and the Insolvent Corporation)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
French Abstract: A l'aube de l'entree en vigueur de la Loi edictant la Loi sur le Programme de protection des salaries et modifiant la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilite, la Loi sur les arrangements avec les creanciers et d'autres lois en consequences, L.C. 2005 c. C-47, la legislation canadienne sur l'insolvabilite faisant l'objet d'une ambitieuse reforme, le present article vise a jeter un eclairage nouveau sur l'interet et le role reserve a l'actionnaire d'une entreprise insolvable, et ce en s'attardant a deux etapes cruciales auxquelles toute telle entreprise doit faire face. D'abord, au stade de l'institution du processus de restructuration ou de faillite. Est-ce que l'actionnaire doit etre informe de l'intention des administrateurs d'avoir recours a la legislation sur l'insolvabilite? Peut-il empecher un tel recours (droit de veto prevu dans les status constitutifs, convention d'actionnaires, etc.)? Ensuite, au stade de l'elaboration d'un plan de restructuration et de sa mise en place. L'actionnaire peut-il voter sur le plan de restructuration ou sur la proposition mise de l'avant par les administrateurs? Dans quelle mesure un tel plan de restructuration ou une telle proposition doivent-ils prendre en consideration l'interet de l'actionnaire? L'interet doit-il etre analyse a la seul lumiere du scenario de liquidation? Ces questions forment la trame de fonds de l'analyse proposee dans le present article, analyse qui sera ponctuee d'une revue de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine marquante en plus de faire reference aux dispositions adoptees, mais toujours non en vigueur, de la Loi C-47. English Abstract: As the new An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2005, c. C-47 operating an ambitious reform of the Canadian legislation on insolvency is about to come into force, this article attempts to shed new light on the interest and role of the shareholder of an insolvent corporation. It focuses more specifically on two critical stages that any corporation in this situation will be facing. First, when the restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings are introduced. Should the shareholder be informed of administrators' intent to have recourse to the insolvency legislation? Can the shareholder prevent such recourse (veto right included in the constitutive statute, shareholders' convention, etc.)? Then, when a restructuring plan is elaborated and implemented. Can the shareholder vote on the restructuring plan or on the administrators' proposal? To what extent should a restructuring plan or a proposal of this nature take into consideration the shareholder's interest? Should the interest be analyzed in light solely of the liquidation scenario? These issues constitute the pith and substance of the analysis proposed in this article, which comprises a review of the leading case law and doctrine, as well as references to the adopted C-47 provisions, yet not in force.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.008 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".