Money Bills and the Use of the Royal Recommendation in Canada: Practice Versus Principle?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In current parliamentary practice, bills which require the royal recommendation are referred to as 'money bills'. The only bills guaranteed to the executive in the Constitution Act, 1867 are true appropriation bills, but the term 'money bill' has come to mean much more than that: it has been loosely used to cover a variety of meanings, depending on the context in which it is employed. The result is that an extensive definition of money bill has effectively restricted the powers of the Senate and of private members, in a manner which the Constitution itself does not prescribe. The definition of a 'money bill' has been perpetuated, in part, by the form in which the royal recommendation has taken in recent years, as well as the reliance in parliamentary practice, upon speakers' rulings, precedent and authorities which do not address the constitutional issue. The legal effect of this practice is examined in this paper. The powers and privileges of the Senate, private members and the House of Commons with respect to financial legislation are circumscribed by sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and by convention. The House of Commons asserts the same exclusive and extensive privileges with respect to financial legislation as does the British Commons. The Senate has not conceded that it is subject to the same disabilities as the Lords in England. The legality of this debate is explored, and it is suggested that there are strong objections which can be raised as against a simple adoption of the practice and position of the Houses in Britain. It is suggested that the legislative process with respect to financial legislation is, quite arguably, open to constitutional challenge.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.008 | 0.030 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.023 | 0.039 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.010 |
| Open science | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.011 | 0.013 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".