Bibliographic record
Abstract
The rise of globalism has allowed businesses to expand their chains of production across the world and forced them to compete internationally. This expansion of competition has also extended to the labor market, as workers must now often compete with other workers from around the globe. This increased competition has put severe downward pressure on wages and compensation, while at the same time making it far more difficult for workers to press for improvements in the workplace. The result is a growing need for employee collective action, combined with a decreased effectiveness of such measures.This Article examines the main strategies for employee collective action, including coordination among foreign employee groups, pressure on employers to adopt codes of conduct or other voluntary labor standards agreements, new types of employee groups that focus on the needs of workers in the global economy, and government action that promotes labor standards and rights in the global economy. None of these strategies has produced substantial gains for workers thus far, and it is quite possible that this disappointment will continue for the foreseeable future. The effectiveness of these strategies will likely improve as employee groups become more adept at finding the combination of the techniques that provides the most benefit in a given situation; however, the competitive pressures of globalism will always remain as a significant impediment. This Article therefore argues that the only real hope for genuine improvements in the workplace - particularly for low-wage employees - is government action. Whether through domestic legal protection for employee collection action or pressure on other countries in support of labor standards, government action remains the best, albeit far from assured, hope for workers in the global economy.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.016 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.016 | 0.017 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.017 |
| Research integrity | 0.009 | 0.012 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.047 | 0.012 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".