Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Many interesting behaviours in the animal and human world involve cooperation among individuals. Yet, cooperating individuals are often susceptible to exploitation by cheaters. Because cheaters do better than the cooperators they exploit, the evolution and persistence of cooperation has been a challenging topic of study in biology, sociology and economics. Studies often abstract from real cooperative interactions, and construct simple games in which players can choose either cooperation with other players, or defection, e.g., the well known prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. In these games and other social dilemmas, mutual cooperation yields greater payoffs than mutual defection, but individuals are still tempted to defect (because of the possibility that if they cooperate, the other player will defect). Similar dilemmas also arise in situations where multiple individuals may be affected by the actions of one (such as volunteering for community service or evading taxes), and the main theme of this thesis is cooperation in groups. In chapter 2, we analyze pre-emptive vaccination for an outbreak of smallpox (following a bioterrorist attack or accidental release), from the public health (i.e., group) and individual perspectives. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with an extension of the snowdrift game to n interacting players and continuous strategy sets (where individuals decide on their degree of cooperation): in chapter 3, we analyze global evolutionary stability of cooperative strategies in a large class of n-player snowdrift games in infinite populations; chapter 4 analyzes general continuous n-person snowdrift games in finite populations, and compares the evolutionary dynamics with their infinite population analogues. In chapter 5, we present a general framework to model selection processes in finite populations, necessary for the analysis in chapter 4.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.010 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it