Bibliographic record
Abstract
T he purpose of this essay is to see how adequate has been the American military strategy towards Northeast Asia under the Clinton administration after the cold war and to see how it may change under the Bush administration. Republican control of both the White House and Congress, for the first time since 1953, may permit a more united policy toward two major sources of tension in Northeast Asia, the divided countries of Korea and China. Until now, U.S. policy towards China in particular has been a continual bone of contention between President and Congress, except possibly under Nixon and Kissinger, when the U.S. and China began to cooperate informally against the common Soviet threat. The continued ability of the U.S. to intervene so robustly in the Northeast Asian region rests heavily on its forward-based military presence in Japan and South Korea and its guarantees of protection to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The threat of a renewal of hostilities in Korea and tensions over Taiwan from 1993 to 1996 prompted the Clinton administration's modifications of the U.S. regional strategy. The clearest exposition is in the Pentagon's East Asian Strategy Reports of 1995 and 1998, which are taken up in section three.1 The striking economic returns and the promise of future returns in Northeast Asia have proven to be a powerful incentive to maintain peace and stability in the region. They have brought China and, probably now, even North Korea out of their isolation from the world economy and helped curb regional security tensions. It seems doubtful that the new Bush administration will soon make major changes in the U.S. military or economic strategies toward the region, despite its insistence on a less accommodating policy toward China, its determination to deploy missile defenses, and some loss of faith in nuclear deterrence and international arms control agreements.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".