Bibliographic record
Abstract
F oreign aid is basically a diplomatic instrument. The United States was the first country to employ aid systematically in order to achieve its major foreign policy goals in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Of the several less developed countries that have received U.S. aid since the 1950s, Nepal was one of the first. Nepal and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1947 and four years later signed the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation on 23January 1951. The external factors, i.e. the strategic location of South Asia and the potential risk this region was exposed to from communist powers, motivated the U.S. to provide aid to countries like Nepal. Similarly, the internal factors, such as the weak and uninstitutionalized governments, general poverty and the growing popularity of national communist parties in South Asia, were equally important motivations for the U.S. to supply aid to countries of South Asia. Nepal was definitely one of the poorest to receive aid yet strategically vital because of its physical proximity to the Tibetan autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. Even more farreaching was the assumption that any communist influence on Nepal could spill over to the South Asian region and beyond to the vulnerable far east. This paper has three main objectives: (a) to examine the fundamental aid objectives of the United States in Nepal during the cold war period, (b) to assess the major accomplishments of the U.S. aid, and (c) to draw conclusions about the directions of U.S. aid in the post-cold war period and explain the implications for Nepal. The paper begins with a brief history of the relations between the two countries. The major part of the paper discusses the United States aid policy in Nepal in the context of its foreign policy objectives and the success of aid in achieving them. The last section draws conclusions about U.S. aid to Nepal and examines possible implications of aid in the post-cold war period.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.010 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".