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Improved Regulatory Oversight and Immediate Retrofits for Operating Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors for Beyond Design Basis Accidents

2012· article· en· W2318962839 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Sunil Nijhawan

Bibliographic record

VenueVolume 5: Fusion Engineering; Student Paper Competition; Design Basis and Beyond Design Basis Events; Simple and Combined Cycles · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicNuclear and radioactivity studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsContainment (computer programming)Nuclear powerRetrofittingMileEngineeringRisk analysis (engineering)BusinessComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The most painful lessons that engineers will learn from reviews of the Fukushima disaster relates to the unacknowledged failure of regulators, designers and utilities in better retrofitting existing reactors in a timely manner to better withstand and mitigate known severe accident related challenges to reactor and containment integrity. Commercial nuclear power reactors have operated for over 50 years, and the first severe accident progression studies and understanding of related phenomena began to mature over 30 years ago. However, some very basic accident prevention, mitigation and management measures have not been required by the regulators and hence not initiated by the utilities. In public reviews that inevitably followed, severe accidents in power reactors at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima have been often presented as site specific aberrations in design, operations, safety culture and acts of God beyond mortal imagination. If a sincere soul searching, regulatory overhaul and actual, effective, timely and far reaching measures are not taken for operating reactors, the world is bound to witness recurring severe core damage scenarios followed by series of studies that will predictably conclude that such severe accidents can happen only in other jurisdictions and in other designs and that ‘our’ reactors are ‘safe’ and only minor enhancements are required to placate the anxious public or inquiring regulators. The paper examines the role played by regulators and other Canadian stakeholders in failure to ensure that the so-called residual risk from operating nuclear reactors is minimized in a timely manner. It presents specific examples of known deficiencies in PHWR designs that may degrade a sustained loss of power from a recoverable outcome into significantly more severe consequences. It discusses ideas for potential design retrofits and reiterates the need for more open, concerted and cooperative efforts internationally in accident progression and consequence analyses and supporting experiments. Taking station blackout as example of an instigator of a severe accident, the paper discusses certain elements of the current PHWR designs that accelerate the onset and progression of core damage and present substantially degraded opportunities for mitigation and control. It demonstrates how in many cases, a sustained loss of power in a PHWR may cause a containment bypass with early and unacceptable off-site consequences. Many issues discussed in this paper are common to other reactor designs and regulatory jurisdictions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.644
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.218
Teacher spread0.205 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designBench or experimental
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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