MAARTJE M. ABBENHUIS. The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 2006. Pp. 423.  40.70

As war engulfed Europe in August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson exhorted Americans to remain “impartial in thought as well as in action.” His words might equally, and with more reason, have applied to the Netherlands. The Dutch dilemma in 1914 was straightforward. On sea it was confronted by a maritime blockade imposed by Britain that threatened the economic livelihood of the Dutch people. On land the Dutch border with Germany, effectively lengthened after the occupation of Belgium, raised the possibility of German aggression. Both sides were thus capable of coercing the Netherlands, and both sides could imperil the existence of the Dutch state. And yet, neither violated Dutch neutrality through the long years of war. Given this state of affairs, how the Netherlands managed to preserve its neutrality is worth exploring. Historians such as Marc Frey have stressed that Dutch neutrality rested less upon Dutch actions than it did upon policies made in London, Paris, and Berlin. Maartje M. Abbenhuis does not contest this view, commenting “[w]hether a small state entered the Great War was principally decided by the policies of the most powerful belligerents” (p. 31). If this might leave readers perplexed as to what room for explanation remains, Abbenhuis argues that while the international dimensions of Dutch neutrality have been examined, the domestic context has been ignored. Internal compliance with the rigors of neutrality was required if war was to be staved off. Abbenhuis posits that the “military aspects” of domestic neutrality were crucial (p. 21). The Dutch armed forces found themselves not only the defenders of the state but also the guarantors of neutrality. A dual responsibility existed: to act as a conventional armed deterrent and to deal with a range of tasks that might invoke the wrath of one or more of the belligerents. The latter were numerous. It was the army that coped with the flood of refugees that threatened to swamp the Netherlands in 1914; it was the army that attempted to check rampant smuggling; it was the army that, backed by the imposition of a state of siege, quickly became the guardian of order. But the effects of war were corrosive, for while the size of the army swelled as a consequence of these greater internal responsibilities it was increasingly incapable of meeting these challenges. By 1917 the toll exacted by mobilizations—not one but two—the lack of training and modern equipment, and the tensions engendered by the need for constant vigilance had markedly diminished the army's effectiveness. The Dutch army of 1918, though more than twice the size of its 1914 predecessor, was a weaker reed. When it appeared in the spring of 1918 that the Germans might invade, pessimism was unbounded. The commander in chief of the Dutch armed forces, General C. J. Snijders, told the Dutch cabinet that war with Germany “would be disastrous” (p. 244).

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