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Record W2343126504

Strategic Voting in the 2010 UK Election

2011· article· en· W2343126504 on OpenAlexaff
John H. Aldrich, Aaron M. Houck, Paul R. Abramson, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto

Bibliographic record

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsThe Scarborough HospitalUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCondorcet methodRespondentVotingApproval votingBullet votingCompromisePreferenceCardinal voting systemsRanked voting systemGeneral electionPolitical scienceDisapproval votingPairwise comparisonGroup voting ticketFirst-past-the-post votingEconomicsMicroeconomicsComputer scienceLawPoliticsArtificial intelligence
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper analyzes strategic voting in the 2010 UK General Election using survey data from the 2010 British Election Study (BES). The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, we use survey responses to generate respondent-level preference orderings among the three major parties. Using these preference orderings, we simulate the 2010 election as if it were a national election using four different electoral systems: pairwise comparisons (in search of a Condorcet winner), the Borda count, the alternative vote, and Coombs’ method. We found that the Lib-Dems were the Condorcet winner and, as the compromise party, won under every tested method except the alternative vote (which they advocated). In the second part, we empirically test a rational-choice model of strategic voting. The model predicts that voters should take into accounted the expected utility of their vote and vote for their second-most preferred candidate if their first choice is clearly in third place in terms of likelihood of winning. The 2010 election offers a compelling case study because of the strong performance of the Lib-Dems, who traditionally finished a distant third. Our statistical analysis of the BES survey data provides support for our theoretical model of strategic voting.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.046
Threshold uncertainty score0.628

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.051
GPT teacher head0.218
Teacher spread0.167 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2011
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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