Strategy in Hard Times: The Long March for Capabilities, 1964—1990
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, left behind for his successors a daunting legacy of foreign-policy challenges in regard to both ends and means, or goals and capabilities. His enduring legacy was a grand strategy, organized around the fundamental aim of a foreign policy of independence rather than one subordinate to either of the two superpowers, the US or the Soviet Union. Associated with it was also the aspiration, largely implicit but at times explicit, for India to become a member of the major-power system. Nehru's strategy was surely marked by a certain grandeur, and it was an open question whether his successors would be able to rise to the challenge of its demands. There is, indeed, a line of argument that maintains that, until almost the end of the twentieth century, his successors lacked both the vision of India as a major power, and the will and capacity to build and mobilize the requisite capabilities to achieve it. For example, Ashok Kapur holds that up to 1998 the various governments at the center after Nehru, headed by the Congress Party or former leaders from that party, were befuddled by a Gandhian and Nehruvian morality. Accordingly, they were too weak-kneed politically to make a determined push for a major-power role for India in defiance of the major powers, particularly the US. More specifically, they are said to have lacked the political and moral capacity to make a clear and public definition of India's strategic priorities, or the determination to pursue them.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".