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Record W2484076663 · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139507684.007

On the purpose and limitations of game-theoretic models

2014· book-chapter· en· W2484076663 on OpenAlexaff
Lawrence A. Boland

Bibliographic record

VenueCambridge University Press eBooks · 2014
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsSimon Fraser University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMathematical economicsGame theoryComputer scienceEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Harsanyi and Selten [1988] embarked on a project to find conditions that would plausibly select a unique noncooperative equilibrium point to be the solution to any matrix game. Central to this approach was the acceptance of … [John] Nash’s [1951] formal concept of a noncooperative equilibrium as the central necessary property of any solution. The viewpoint espoused here is that the search for a unique noncooperative equilibrium solution to all games poses many interesting philosophical problems in an abstract world inhabited by abstract von Neumann game players with unlimited intelligence and perception and no passions or personality traits. These players act in an institution free world where context is implicitly accounted for in the matrix game or the extensive form of the game. Unfortunately, as a portrayal of human decision-making it fails to appreciate the fundamental limitations in attempting to portray an open evolving system where the dynamics are context dependent and the institutions of any society are the carriers of process. Martin Shubik [2012, p. 2] The obstacle facing anyone who wishes to discuss any limitations of using game theory to build economic models or even criticize game theory or game-theoretic models is the bifurcation of the proponents. On the one hand, we have the economists who are building game-theoretic models in the hopes that they can overcome one of the short-comings of both Marshallian partial-equilibrium analysis, which looks only at the behaviour of singular, price-taking individuals who are just minding their own business, and those who complain about Walrasian general-equilibrium models, which do not recognize the diversity in an economy or the interaction between individuals beyond buying and selling in the markets. On the other hand, we have the mathematics-oriented game theorists who lead the way in game-theoretic analysis and who, regardless of realism, are willing to assume anything that helps them construct their proofs or find solutions for their equilibrium models. Most of the critical questions I discussed at the end of Chapter 3 are the result of these mathematics-oriented assumptions. This chapter will focus on whether the mathematical devices and assumptions that have been invented to answer those questions are as useful as game theorists think or as limited as some critical economic model builders think.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.017
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.052

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.017
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0020.023
Scholarly communication0.0090.023
Open science0.0040.005
Research integrity0.0050.011
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.140
GPT teacher head0.264
Teacher spread0.124 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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