Bibliographic record
Abstract
It is for the sake of happiness that we all do everything else we do. ( E.N . i .12, 1102a2–3) Aristotle claims that we do everything for the sake of happiness ( eudaimonia ). It is now well recognized that he does not mean by this that our actions are aimed at making us feel happy, satisfied, or otherwise pleased. “Happiness” ( eudaimonia ), for Aristotle, is a placeholder for “the ultimate end in life” – that which we desire for its own sake and for whose sake we pursue all our other objectives ( E.N . i .2, 1094a18–19; cf. i .7, 1097a30–b6). The normative question of importance to Aristotle, as well as for the rest of Greek ethics, is not whether we should pursue happiness, but rather what happiness consists in. Is it for the sake of pleasure, honor, virtue, contemplation, or something else that we should direct all our actions in life? The answer to this normative question was disputed among the major philosophical schools in antiquity, and the precise nature of Aristotle’s own answer has been a matter of considerable controversy among his modern interpreters. Could he really be affirming, as he patently appears to in E.N . x .7–8, that the ultimate goal of life is to engage in theoretical contemplation ( theoria )? Would not this “intellectualist” conception of the ultimate good imply that ethical activity (the exercise of the virtues of character) is for the sake of contemplation? And how could this be so? Aristotle’s extensive discussion of ethical activity shows no evidence that he takes it to be productive of contemplation, nor does it seem credible that he thinks our commitment to it should be contingent on its ability to yield this result.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.018 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.006 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".