Bibliographic record
Abstract
Given the economic advantages enjoyed by the United States under existing arrangements, why don't other states try to initiate change to gain some of these advantages for themselves? The purpose of this chapter is to explore what sorts of developments would have to take place to challenge American hegemony and how likely it is that these will occur. The first question to address is at which point allies will start to view American hegemony as a liability. Although the hegemon has a license to act unilaterally – refusing to sign on to international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court, and even to circumvent the Security Council – a superpower that is too cavalier gathers resentment. Dissatisfaction in one area may well percolate into other areas. The further apart the United States and allies are politically, the less attractive American product and capital markets will seem. Bush era policies – the war on terror, and Guantanamo Bay, constituting the most unpopular examples – transformed the United States into a military target, and unwittingly risked severing the positive link between securing and attracting foreign investment. The second question deserving attention is whether allies have a sufficiently strong fallback position to make withholding support of American hegemony rational. When allies turn away from American hegemony, to whom will they turn instead? In the 1980s, we had Japan and a fairly decentralized regional grouping in Europe. Today, amalgamation in East Asia and Europe is producing alternative power structures, and China shows all the signs of wanting to rule the world, though not yet having the capacity.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.013 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.015 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".