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Record W2516569635 · doi:10.3138/cjh.ach.51.2.rev24

<i>Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research</i> by Sarah Bridger

2016· article· en· W2516569635 on OpenAlex
Paul Rubinson

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of History · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicNuclear Issues and Defense
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNuclear weaponCold warNuclear ethicsLawArms controlNational securityPolitical sciencePentagonNuclear warfareSociologyPolitics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research, by Sarah Bridger. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2015. x, 350 pp. $45.00 US (cloth). Fresh off success of Manhattan Project and troubled by role in creating atomic bomb, US scientists attempted to guide national security policy away from reliance on nuclear weapons. Science advising a chance for nuclear redemption in form of arms (24), Sarah Bridger explains in Scientists at War, an analysis of how science advisors tried to cope with ethical burdens of (270) during Cold War. Science advisors used technical expertise to advocate for nuclear arms control and diversification of conventional weapons as a counter to Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy that relied exclusively on nuclear weapons and risked nuclear war. But as Bridger makes devastatingly clear, this influence over policymaking ultimately backfired: policies and technologies that scientists advocated, such as limited warfare, anti-infiltration systems, and chemical and biological weapons were seen as ethical alternatives to nuclear war, but were ultimately used to unleash incredible violence on Vietnam that was nearly as troubling as Hiroshima had been. During 1960s, meanwhile, a new generation opposed science's connection to folly and brutality of Vietnam. Along with challenging science's links to defense establishment, younger scientists reassessed discipline from an activist, ethical perspective, and in process questioned Pentagon funding, apolitical stance of professional organizations, and fundamental concepts such as objectivity. According to Bridger, these two generations reconciled conflicting paradigms when they united to oppose Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1980s, as a near-consensus of scientists young and old opposed system on both ethical and technical levels. The book powerfully illustrates dilemma of political power. On a detailed level, though, nuance is lost. Bridger argues that government scientists used language to support anti-nuclearism, but offers an overly broad definition of moral, describing, for example, a scientists' statement that a nuclear test ban was in the best interests of United States and world peace as a moral message (54). Such a claim, however, was typical Cold War pabulum that differed tremendously from language of outsider scientists such as Linus Pauling, who morally castigated American people as murderers, mass murderers for testing nuclear weapons [No More War!, New York, 1983, 215). In fact, government scientists purposefully distanced themselves from moralists like Pauling. When science advisors produced a study arguing that nuclear weapons would not help achieve US goals in Vietnam, they used language scrubbed of any or ethical taint, although conclusions came from their values and commitment to preventing nuclear war (133-134). …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.127
Threshold uncertainty score0.589

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.089
GPT teacher head0.365
Teacher spread0.276 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it