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Record W2518465119 · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316480960.006

Historical Trends in Government Responses

2016· book-chapter· en· W2518465119 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Dawn Brancati

Bibliographic record

VenueCambridge University Press eBooks · 2016
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicPolitical Conflict and Governance
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDemocracyGovernment (linguistics)Quarter (Canadian coin)Period (music)Political scienceOrder (exchange)Political economyCold warHistoryPoliticsSociologyLawEconomicsArt

Abstract

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In the post–Cold War period, governments ignored democracy protests almost as often as they accommodated them, but violent repression was by far the most common response. Between 1989 and 2011, governments violently repressed two-thirds of all democracy protests that occurred in this period using either military or police force and nonviolently repressed approximately one-third of them. (See Figure 6.1.) Governments made concessions to slightly less than a quarter of all democracy protests in this period, and in two-thirds of these cases, governments only made these concessions after first trying to repress the protests through either violent or nonviolent means. In this chapter, I examine how governments respond to democracy protests in detail, as well as the conditions surrounding these responses, in order to inform the subsequent statistical analysis of government responses to democracy protests. ACCOMMODATION When governments accommodated democracy protests in the post–Cold War period, they did so through either political, economic, or policy concessions. Economic and policy concessions were less common than political concessions, always occurred alongside the latter, and included among other things, promises to improve living standards, create public sector employment, reduce corruption, and so forth. Only concessions on political matters had the potential to affect the structure of regimes. These concessions ranged from modest reforms to eliminate electoral fraud in particular districts to more significant reforms to establish or restore suspended elections. (See Figure 6.2). Electoral Competitiveness Political concessions to increase the openness and competitiveness of national elections were the most common type of political reforms governments made in response to democracy protests in the post–Cold War period and the second most common demand of the protests. Reforms targeting the competitiveness of elections generally included legalizing opposition parties, permitting multiparty elections for national offices, and lifting bans on particular political parties or candidates. (See Table 6.1.) In one case, Zimbabwe (1990), the government did not lift an existing ban on the opposition, but decided in response to the protests not to impose a ban on opposition parties. No government in this period was willing to extend the vote to excluded groups, as protesters in the early 1990s demanded for women in Kuwait and foreigners in the Ivory Coast and Zambia. Reforms to expand the right to vote were limited to initiatives to extend voter registration periods and facilitate voter registration in other ways.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.010
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.035

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.010
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0030.008
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0030.003
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.043
GPT teacher head0.251
Teacher spread0.208 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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