THE OCTOBER HANDSHAKE OF 1970: Making Sense of Canada's Recognition of the People's Republic of China

After two decades of a disappointing relationship between Canada and the People's Republic of China (PRC)-seriously damaged during the Korean War and relieved by wheat sales after the Great Leap-Pierre Trudeau's government wanted to end China's isolation.The new prime minister was determined to ensure that his country could recognize the Communist regime.Even more surprisingly, Ottawa's opening of relations with Beijing would soon be followed by Washington.Such words as "rapprochement" were therefore repeated in North America as this extraordinary diplomatic event began to unfold in the late 1960s.In hindsight, Sino-Canadian rapprochement seems full of contradictions: at a time when Canada's closest ally was still fighting in Vietnam, and when the Chinese were shouting anti-imperialist slogans during the Cultural Revolution, how could it be possible that Ottawa and Beijing wished to become friends?The central question this thesis poses and answers is why the two governments suddenly shifted positions at such a politically sensitive moment.Offering different ways to understand this thirty-year-old question, the thesis re-examines Trudeau's and Maoist China's remarkable, but often forgotten, diplomatic breakthrough.Indeed, although Canadians were paying closer attention to the nation's "October Crisis" in 1970, the "October Handshake" in Stockholm between representatives of Canada and China in the same month was also a iii significant event.The success of such a diplomatic achievement could be seen in the Sino-American rapprochement that followed and in China's new place in the world community.Drawing on various historical records, including materials from the archives of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Queen's University, this study explains the agreement between Beijing and Ottawa in 1970 as the coincidence of three crucial conditions: the rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances at the time, a favourable internal political climate, and the matching mentality of the extraordinary players from both countries.Furthermore, while existing accounts of Sino-Canadian rapprochement highlight both countries' external relations, this thesis will argue that an exploration of the dynamics of domestic politics and the roles of individual leaders can expand our understanding of decision-making during the process of normalization of relations between China and Canada.Chapter 1 diplomatic relations with China.By then, Ottawa's decisions were clearly a manifestation of Cold War geopolitics characterized by East-West confrontation and China's isolation.Two decades later, anti-imperialism was still a clear component of the PRC's foreign policy throughout the early phase of the Cultural Revolution.Given that Canadians had fought against Chinese troops on the Korean War battlefield, Canada was sometimes regarded by the Chinese as simply a partner of American imperialist policy.If the Chinese leaders were to act according to their Cultural Revolution rhetoric, then normalization of relations would not be possible.On the other side, a policy of rapprochement towards Red China would unquestionably anger Canada's closest ally.To Washington, it was one of the most irritating Canadian foreign policies of the era.Therefore in 1966 and 1967, the chances for any relationship between China and Canada seemed slim.In order to fully understand the context of the historical Sino-Canadian rapprochement of 1970, it is important to first explore the political atmosphere between Beijing and Ottawa immediately after Canada's failure to recognize the PRC.Shortly after the inauguration of the PRC on October 1, 1949, bilateral relations became icy when the Korean War broke out in July 1950.When the Korean conflict erupted, the attitude of the United States toward Communist China hardened and the Canadian government considered it prudent to put its recognition plans on hold.More importantly, as the United Nations (UN) declared in February 1951 that the PRC's role in the Korean War was that of an "aggressor," major obstacles appeared in the path of official recognition and Canada put the question aside. 1Since the day that the Korean War became a major conflict between the Chinese and UN forces, Canadians could no longer remain uninvolved as Ottawa took an active role in the war.Some Canadians believed that Communism was a threat to the world and fought in the Korean War.With Canada's increasing involvement in the military conflict, the Chinese felt more suspicious towards Canadians, especially when there was open hostility in the war zone between the Chinese "volunteer fighters" and the Canadian Army under the UN flag. 2 In Chinese eyes, the image of Canadians changed from "foreign friends" to "enemy aliens."According to a Canadian missionary, those who were still in the PRC at the time were seen as enemies, and some as international cultural spies: I, a foreigner, had the alternative of leaving the country [the People's Republic of China].This alternative became realistically the only choice later on when China joined the cause of North Korea, making me an "enemy alien" for I was automatically classed as an anti-revolutionary, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War when all North Americans were enemy aliens.

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