Creating the 2nd Tactical Air Force (RAF): Inter-Service and Anglo-Canadian Co-operation in WWII
Bibliographic record
Abstract
he success ultimately enjoyed by Anglo-Canadian and American armies during the final two years of the Second World War had its roots in the effective and overwhelming air support that these armies received.First in North Africa, and later in Italy and North West Europe, American, British and Empire armies fought most if not all of their battles with the knowledge that they enjoyed unassailable air superiority throughout the battle area and, consequently, they expected considerable tactical air support.By 1944 this decisive advantage was confirmed when the twin factors of matériel superiority and common doctrine were actively combined.The latter -an accepted common doctrine -was attained through hardearned battle experience in North Africa and the resolution of a long and tortuous debate, mainly in London, over who should control aircraft on the battlefield.This debate had raged on since the end of the First World War.The two main protagonists were the British Army and the Royal Air Force, but in a small yet relevant way, tangential to its resolution, was Canadian participation.At the start of the war there were many joint and combined difficulties to overcome."When the first squadron [Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) army co-operation squadron] went to Britain in early 1940," wrote Canada's official historians, "it inevitably became embroiled in all the troubles which frustrated its RAF peers, in addition to those problems inherent in the broader picture of Anglo-Canadian cooperation." 2 Airmen and soldiers did not work well together at the outset of the war, and Anglo-Canadian cooperation struggled on a number of practical and political levels.However, the Anglo-Canadian partnership had as many benefits as disadvantages, especially in terms of the combined resources marshalled for war, namely matériel, manpower and, in the case of army-air co-operation, intellectual capital.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.035 | 0.009 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.008 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".