The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11
Bibliographic record
Abstract
To protect American investment abroad, the United States traditionally endorsed arbitration as the preferred means to resolve disputes between investors and host countries. Arbitration was justified as a way to level the procedural playing field in controversies over expropriation, reducing the prospect of "home town justice" in host country courts. Recently this policy has been tested by provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) intended to enhance cross-border investment. If one NAFTA country victimizes an investor from another, the investor has a right to seek redress through arbitration. The United States now finds itself a Respondent in several cases brought by Canadian investors asserting discrimination, unfair treatment, or expropriation without compensation, often allegedly committed by American states. Certain segments of American society have objected to these arbitrations as constituting unacceptable interference with governmental economic regulation. Fueled by media attacks, legislation has been proposed (and in some cases enacted) to limit the effectiveness of arbitration pursuant to bilateral investment treaties. Moreover, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission has issued "Notes of Interpretation" intended to soften the rigor of certain NAFTA provisions. This Article suggests that assaults on investment arbitration are misguided, and may end up doing more harm than good On balance, arbitration serves as a positive force in the protection of legitimate economic expectations abroad Impairing neutral arbitral dispute resolution will enfeeble international cooperation by chilling confidence in the security of cross-border transactions. Moreover, the United States' own national interest in safeguarding American-owned assets from foreign political risks requires maintaining an arbitration regime to resolve investment disputes.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.012 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.013 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.018 | 0.014 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".