Extended rationality: a hinge epistemology
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This book focuses on recent debates about perceptual warrant. Against the ‘liberal’ views of Jim Pryor (an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P (21)) and the ‘conservative’ views of Crispin Wright (an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P, and ‘it is warrantedly assumed that there is an external world’ (29–30)), Coliva defends a ‘moderatism,’ according to which an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P, and ‘it is assumed [unwarrantedly] that there is an external world’ (34). This ‘hinge epistemology’ turns on Wittgenstein's insight that empirical beliefs rest on assumptions that are themselves unfounded (1972: §253), and which serve as the ‘hinges’ (§§341 and 343) of our epistemic practices. Coliva sacrifices (125–126) Wittgenstein's distinctive treatment of ‘hinges’ as ‘norm[s] of description’ (1972: §167), but how different is her treatment of certain unfounded assumptions as constitutive of extended epistemic rationality? Her internalist, individualist starting point sits uneasily with Wittgenstein's pluralism (see Williams 1996), much as her endorsement of ‘an anti-realist conception of truth’ (37, 149) sits uneasily with Wittgenstein's deflationary sympathies. However, the idea that unfounded assumptions may still be ‘epistemically rational’ (129) deserves serious consideration from epistemologists.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it