Bibliographic record
Abstract
I am grateful to each of the commentators for their detailed and careful engagement with my work. In responding to their comments, I am not able to address all of the particulars that they mention, and so focus instead what a take to be the main areas of disagreement. Most of these focus on the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Both Steele and Cornell propose to soften the distinction by focusing on the effects of an action, rather than exclusively on norms of conduct. Dagan and Dorfman deny the distinction, treating it as an artifact of moral and information-processing limitations of legal institutions. Gardner focuses more on a methodological issue, which concerns the nature and justification of private legal authority, which I regard as inseparable from the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. I will begin with Gardner’s generous comment, because I think clarifying the issue that he raises will bring my treatment of the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance into sharper focus. Gardner focuses on one footnote in my book. I should concede from the outset that my choice of wording was unfortunate in several ways. I should not have used the word “indicate” there to characterize the relation between an authority and the reasons that apply to those subject to it. As Gardner correctly points out, an indicator, however reliable, is not authoritative; something only counts as an authority if its say-so determines what you must do. Gardner captures the service conception’s account of successful exercises of authority: authorities “serve us wisely, more particularly, by helping us to do what it is anyway, apart from the authority’s intervention, wise for us to do.” My claim in that footnote is that the private authority you have over your body or property is different; there is no authority-independent fact of the matter about what those subject to your authority have reason to do with your body and property “apart from the authority’s intervention.” They must refrain from interfering with it without your authorization, which is just to say that apart from your intervention, they must acknowledge your authority, that is, that it is up to you, not to them.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".