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Record W2598848133

Overloading International Human Rights Law

2015· article· en· W2598848133 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Erika George

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the Annual Meeting-American Society of International Law · 2015
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicInternational Law and Human Rights
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsHuman rightsDignityLawInternational human rights lawPolitical scienceFundamental rightsInclusion (mineral)Right to propertyBill of rightsSociologySocial science
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This panel was convened at 11:00 a.m., Friday, April 10, by its moderator Aaron Fellmeth of Arizona State University College of Law, who introduced the panelists: Erika George of University of Utah SJ. Quinney College of Law; Frederic Megret of McGill University Faculty of Law; James Nickel of University of Miami School of Law; and Henry Shue of University of Oxford. * INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY AARON FELLMETH ([dagger]) The list of rights included in the corpus of international human rights law has always been controversial. At the drafting of the International Bill of Rights, many wealthy democracies opposed the inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights as merely aspirational. Some of these rights, such as the right to paid vacations and, in many places, free universal primary education, certainly were and some still are. The claim at the time was that such interests were not fit subjects for human rights because, as important as they might be to human dignity and flourishing, their inclusion was unrealistic. And it would by association potentially degrade the short list of realizable rights, such as freedom of expression and fair trial, to mere moral exhortations rather than legally enforceable mandates. In addition, some purported rights, such as the right to the benefits of science, do not seem to fit into the classic category of Hohfeldian claim-right. The substance of the right is exceedingly vague, and it is unclear against whom the right is properly invoked. Today only a few outliers such as the United States continue to deny the binding status of such rights, but many such rights still reflect aspiration more than reality in most of the world. At the same time, some states, as well as many academics and advocates, have been attempting to grow the list of human rights and expand it to new fields. These include, by way of example: (1) environmental rights; (2) intellectual property rights; (3) group rights (in the corporate, as opposed to collective, sense); (4) animal rights; and (5) a right to Internet access. Furthermore, many have advocated using international human rights law to control the misdeeds of business organizations in foreign lands, which does not so much propose a new right as expand the universe of direct duty-holders beyond the traditional international actors--states. The reason international human rights law has been deployed for these ends is fairly obvious. As the set of the most fundamental community values, human rights are used to claim priority over most competing policy goals. In general, community interests yield to conflicting rights. And so casting an interest as a human right imparts to a policy goal a gravitas beyond that normally attributed even to a binding legal right or its correlative obligations. Although this is an excellent reason to seek to elevate a much desired goal to the status of a human right, it is not a reason to grant it that status. There are two considerations here, of relative values and of systemic functioning. For an interest to be elevated to a right, there must be sufficient reason for preferring it to most competing interests. Ideally, it should be important to the dignity and flourishing of all persons. The interest in sanitary water satisfies that criterion; does the interest in protecting one's trademarks? As to systemic functioning, this is a multifaceted issue that raises many questions. Is the right's scope and content reasonably ascertainable, or is it doomed to abstraction? Does framing the interest as a right make sense in the context of a system of individual entitlements? Will it protect the interest adequately? Will it enable the undermining of other rights? Will it entail imposing duties on an appropriate subject? To discuss these and related issues, we are fortunate to have a very distinguished group of participants from the fields of philosophy, law, and political theory. …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.013
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.016
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.039
Threshold uncertainty score0.131

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0130.016
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.001
Science and technology studies0.0100.012
Scholarly communication0.0210.018
Open science0.0020.013
Research integrity0.0130.016
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0390.007

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.304
Teacher spread0.284 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueProceedings of the Annual Meeting-American Society of International LawSame topicInternational Law and Human RightsFrench-language works237,207