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Record W2883211378 · doi:10.1108/jfc-05-2017-0048

The battle against fraud: do reporting mechanisms work?

2018· article· en· W2883211378 on OpenAlexaff
Dominic Peltier‐Rivest

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Financial Crime · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicEthics in Business and Education
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsWrongdoingIncentiveBusinessHotlineLanguage changeAccountingPublic relationsWork (physics)Under-reportingPolitical scienceLawEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Purpose This paper aims to explore how well reporting mechanisms work, investigate current trends and develop a framework for implementing effective mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach This study is based on primary and secondary data, criminology theory and best corporate strategies. Findings This study shows that the median number of annual reports equals 1.2 per cent of the number of employees in an organization and that 40 per cent of these reports have merit (Navex Global, 2014). In addition, 42.2 per cent of all frauds are detected through internal reports, whatever their form. Organizations with formal reporting mechanisms sustain fraud losses that are 40.5 per cent less than other organizations (ACFE, 2014). Moreover, employees are more willing to report theft, human resource and workplace issues than fraud and corruption, while 21 per cent of all whistleblowers have experienced some form of retaliation for reporting wrongdoing (Ethics Resource Center, 2014). Results from primary data show that the option to remain anonymous is offered only by 74 per cent of all reporting mechanisms. This paper argues that effective reporting mechanisms should actively encourage whistleblowing, that all credible allegations should be independently investigated and that whistleblowers should be offered the option to remain anonymous. The oversight and the daily administration of reporting mechanisms should be given to two different parties who are independent from management and who do not participate in incentive compensation plans (Lipman, 2012). Research limitations/implications This paper extends previous research by reporting on current hotline trends and integrating various factors into a framework to implement effective reporting mechanisms. Originality/value It is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of reporting mechanisms and current policy trends.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.014
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.104
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.626
Threshold uncertainty score0.903

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0140.104
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.204
GPT teacher head0.429
Teacher spread0.225 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations10
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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