Healthcare reforms, inertia polarization and group influence
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Healthcare systems performance is the focus of intense policy and media attention in most countries. Quebec (Canada) is no exception, where successive governments have struggled for decades with apparently intractable problems in care accessibility overall, poor performance, and rising costs. This article explores the underlying causes of the disconnection between the high salience of healthcare system dysfunctions in both media and policy debates and the lack of policy change likely to remedy those dysfunctions. Academically, public policies' evolution is usually conceptualized as the product of complex, long-term interactions among diverse groups with specific power sources and preferences. In this context, we wanted to examine empirically whether divergences in stakeholders' views concerning various healthcare reform options could explain why certain policy changes are not implemented despite consensus on their programmatic coherence. The research design was an exploratory sequential design. Data were analyzed narratively as well as graphically using a method derived from social network analysis and graph theory. Results showed striking intergroup convergence around a programmatically sound policy package centred on the general objective of strengthening primary care delivery capacities. Those results, interpreted in light of political science elitist perspectives on the policy process, suggest that the incapacity to reform the system might be explained by one or two groups' having a de facto veto in policy-making.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".