Beyond Party Financing: The Rise of Political Ethics Regulation in Canada and France
Bibliographic record
Abstract
While the need to fund election campaigns may lead candidates to compromise their integrity by obtaining illegal funding or using their public office to “sell” favors to wealthy donors, attempts to influence sitting public officials through illegal or unethical means often do not involve party financing. In politics and government, private and public interests intersect in myriad ways in diverse settings, often bearing the potential of unethical behavior and corruption. From this perspective, many countries have adopted more comprehensive policy frameworks to regulate political ethics since the 1970s. Comparing the history of those reforms in Canada and France, we looked for similarities and differences in the factors that triggered legislative changes, the timing and politics of these reforms, as well as some of the characteristics of the adopted measures. We show that 1) there has been a significant expansion of the legislative framework regulating political ethics in both countries over this period, especially over the last 15 years; 2) the combination of media scrutiny, scandals, and party competition has been an essential trigger for reforms in both countries; 3) in addition to politicians, new nongovernmental integrity advocates and expert commissions have played a significant role in the politics of the reform of the last 15 years; and 4) while the regulatory frameworks currently in place in both countries are much more elaborate and intrusive than in the past, they still comprise few possibilities of sanctions and suffer from weak and uneven enforcement.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".