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Record W2902714556 · doi:10.1109/cloudnet.2018.8549403

Evolving Risk Management Against Advanced Persistent Threats in Fog Computing

2018· article· en· W2902714556 on OpenAlexaff
Shaohan Feng, Zehui Xiong, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Amir Leshem

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicBlockchain Technology Applications and Security
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsStackelberg competitionComputer scienceComputer securityFog computingSubgame perfect equilibriumNode (physics)Game theoryInternet of Things

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

With the capability of support mobile computing demand with small delay, fog computing has gained tremendous popularity. Nevertheless, its highly virtualized environment is vulnerable to cyber attacks such as emerging Advanced Persistent Threats attack. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for the fog computing platform. Particularly, we adopt the cyber-insurance as a tool for neutralizing cyber risks from fog computing platform. We consider a fog computing platform containing a group of fog nodes. The platform is composed of three main entities, i.e., the fog computing provider, attacker, and cyber-insurer. The fog computing provider dynamically optimizes the allocation of its defense computing resources to improve the security of the fog computing platform. Meanwhile, the attacker dynamically adjusts the allocation of its attack resources to improve the probability of successful attack. Additionally, to prevent from the potential loss due to attacks, the provider also makes a dynamic decision on the purchases ratio of cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer for each fog node. Thereafter, the cyber-insurer accordingly determines the premium of cyber-insurance for each fog node. In our formulated dynamic Stackelberg game, the attacker and provider act as the followers, and the cyber-insurer acts as the leader. In the lower level, we formulate an evolutionary subgame to analyze the provider's defense and cyber-insurance subscription strategies as well as the attacker's attack strategy. In the upper level, the cyber-insurer optimizes its premium determination strategy, taking into account the evolutionary equilibrium at the lower-level evolutionary subgame. We analytically prove that the evolutionary equilibrium is unique and stable. Moreover, we provide a series of insightful analytical and numerical results on the equilibrium of the dynamic Stackelberg game.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.944
Threshold uncertainty score0.375

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.010
GPT teacher head0.245
Teacher spread0.235 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations12
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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