1938년 체코슬로바키아 위기 시 베네슈와 소련

In the face of the threat of Nazi Germany the national security of the Czechoslovakia was crucially in danger. But France that concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Czechoslovakia in fact gave up the Czechoslovakia because France followed the appeasement policy of Britain. In this situation the attitude of the Soviet Union which concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Czechoslovakia on the 16th day of May 1935 was very important. But the Soviet- Czechoslovakia Treaty will operate between them only if assistance will be rendered by France to the Czechoslovakia which is a victim of the aggression. In spite of the such condition, the Soviet Union definitely expressed the intention of aid to the Czechoslovakia before the Munich Crisis in September 1938. Litvinov confirmed the intention of the Soviet Union’s unilateral aid to the American Ambassador in Moscow, Joseph Davies on March 17, 1938. In particular Stalin also informed the Soviet Unions’s unilateral aid to Benes through Gottwald in the middle of May 1938. In this background Benes who acted initiatively during the May Crisis showed the possibility of the grand alliance that brought about the collective security policy against German aggression. But Benes took the defeatist attitude during the Munich Crisis because of the threat of Britain and France. Stalin once again informed the unilateral aid on September 2, 1938. But Benes secretly informed to Daladier through Necas the intention of concession of territory to the Germany on September 17, 1938. And Benes who received the ultimatum of Britain and France on September 19 immediately inquired that the Soviet Union would keep the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the aid according to the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to the Soviet Union’s instructions the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky immediately informed the intention of aid to the Czechoslovakia at 7:00 p.m. on September 20. But asserting that he took the answer of the Soviet Union immediately after the acceptance of the ultimatum of Britain and France at 5:00 p.m. on September 21 in his own book, Benes distorted the exact date and time of the reply of the Soviet Union. In addition asserting that the problem which he raised to the Soviet Union on September 19 was not the aid according to the Covenant of the League of Nations but the unilateral aid of the Soviet Union, Benes distorted the fact. In spite of Benes’s defeatist attitude Stalin and Litvinov respectively informed the Soviet Union’s unilateral aid on September 18 and 21. In this situation Chamberlain and Halifax took the different attitude to the possibility of the grand alliance owing to the Godesberg talks. Thus Benes had the opportunity to exploit the division of English leadership in order to form the grand alliance including the Soviet Union. Also in this crucial period the Soviet Union informed the situation of arrangement of the Red Army to France on September 25. But Benes who passively followed the situation lost the opportunity that could hold back the aggression of Nazi Germany. The important reason for which Benes did not request the unilateral aid of the Soviet Union in this crucial time was the fear of civil war that would follow the Soviet-Czechoslovakia alliance against Nazi Germany. (Korea University/kssgh@hanmail.net)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.