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Record W2910550699 · doi:10.1093/pq/pqy060

The Functions of Law

2018· article· en· W2910550699 on OpenAlexaff
Michael Giudice

Bibliographic record

VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicLaw in Society and Culture
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPhilosophy of lawLawJurisprudenceFunction (biology)PositivismNatural orderComparative lawPrivate lawScientific lawPositive lawSociologyBlack letter lawEpistemologyPolitical sciencePhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In general jurisprudence, discussion of law's function(s) is rarely sustained. Natural law theorists conceptualize law in terms of its proper moral purpose, such as promotion of the common good. This could be understood as a type of functionalist explanation, but the focus is not really on the function(s) but more so on the essential moral quality of law. Legal positivists sometimes briefly refer to the function(s) of law, but in their standard search for law's necessary features typically restrict their accounts to explanation of law's mode of existence rather than what law might or might not do as a contingent matter. According to this familiar division, either one adopts a morally committed notion of law's functionality or one leaves discussion of functionality to other disciplines, such as sociology of law, which focus on contingent features and relations. In The Functions of Law, Ken Ehrenberg sets out to defend something of a middle ground approach, though his perspective is still a broadly positivist one. As he says, his approach recognizes ‘the centrality of law's functionality to any adequate explanation of the phenomenon’, but does not ‘require the theorist to endorse that functionality or law as the best means of performing it’ (p. 2). In introducing and defending this approach, Ehrenberg offers several helpful contributions to thinking about law's functionality: that law's functionality could be central to understanding law even though law might fail to fulfil its function(s); that law's functionality need not be explained in a way which identifies a general function unique to law; and that law's functionality is essentially tied to its nature as ‘a genre of institutionalized abstract artefact’ (p. 12). Ehrenberg's development of the view of law as an institutionalized abstract artefact is particularly valuable, and engages with the best work in contemporary philosophy on institutions and artefacts. His discussion of the different senses of function—biological functions v. design or artefactual functions, proper functions v. use functions, unintended, latent, and Cummins functions—is also tremendously beneficial in clarifying and assessing a range of claims about functions in general and functions of law in particular. Any account of law's functionality will need to respect these distinctions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesScience and technology studies
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.972
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.004
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.306
Teacher spread0.272 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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