Bibliographic record
Abstract
Canada‘s attitude to the events in Ukraine in 2013–2018 is determined by two factors: general solidarity with western countries and the presence of a large Ukrainian diaspora there. Initially (November 2013 – February 2014), Canada viewed the Ukrainian crisis as an internal political one. However, after the entry of Crimea into Russia, Ottawa began to consider the crisis as international, as a confrontation between Russia and the West. It began to impose the first sanctions against Russia after the Crimean referendum. Primarily, these sanctions were rather limited, but after the beginning of full-scale hostilities in the east of Ukraine in the summer-autumn of 2014, Canada began to introduce sectoral sanctions. Ottawa‘s active participation in various programs of military assistance to Kiev reflects not only solidarity with other member countries of NATO. The Ukrainian diaspora represented by its chief lobby – the Ukrainian Canadian Congress – forces the Canadian government to act more actively in Ukraine, including the military sphere. Military assistance to Kiev is in the context of Ottawa‘s support of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. On the other hand, it is often necessary to separate the real Canadian aid to Ukraine from the “grandstanding”. For example, the discussion in Canada about participation in a possible UN peacekeeping operation in Ukraine was initiated by the Conservative Party primarily as an opportunity to weaken their political opponents – the ruling Liberal Party in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2019. The conservatives‘ proposal for a UN peacekeeping operation contained elements that made it impossible for Russia to accept this proposal. Canadian military assistance to Ukraine is becoming more and more significant and diverse. Ottawa is ready to supply lethal weapons to Kiev. In spite of it, Canada reluctantly agreed to deploy its troops in Latvia. Ottawa took this step not because of the NATO’s request, but under U.S. pressure.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.015 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".