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Record W294675472

The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement

2003· book· en· W294675472 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Clifford S. Russell

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typebook
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicClimate Change Policy and Economics
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEnforcementDeterrence theoryIncentivePublic economicsBusinessLaw enforcementEconomicsLaw and economicsLawPolitical scienceMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Part 1 Optimality overall: the economic theory of public enforcement, Polinsky and Shavell the economics of enforcing air pollution controls, Downing and Watson firm behaviour under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes, Harford enforcement costs and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution, Malik. Part 2 Elaboration of themes - the design of penalties: the structure of penalties in environmental enforcement - an economic analysis, Segerson and Tietenberg guilty until proven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement, Swierzbinski garbage recycling, and illicit burning or dumping, Fullerton and Kinnaman. Part 3 Self-reporting discharges: self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behaviour under imperfectly enforceable regulations, Harford self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution, Malik. Part 4 Extensions of the basic template - using ex-post liability: firm behaviour and regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints, Beavis and Dobbs uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, Segerson. Part 5 Using the regulatory record: cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement, Scholz game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems, Russell an integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, Hentschel and Randall. Part 6 Private and voluntary approaches: optimal standards with incomplete enforcement, Vicusi and Zeckhauser public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, Stranlund private enforcement of federal environmental law, Naysnerski and Tietenberg. Part 7 Empirical work - describing the M&E situation in the US: monitoring and enforcement, Russell environmental crime and punishment - legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental statutes. Part 8 Do monitoring and enforcement efforts make a difference?: effectiveness of the EPA's regulatory enforcement - the case of industrial effluent standards, Magat and Viscusi environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec the costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement, Cohen. Part 9 Cost and benefits of monitoring and enforcement: standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited, Jones. Part 10 Explaining the behaviour of enforcement agencies: the revealed preferences of state EPAs - stringency, enforcement and substitution.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.814
Threshold uncertainty score0.994

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.056
GPT teacher head0.207
Teacher spread0.151 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations8
Published2003
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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