The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Bulow and Klemperer's well-known result states that, in a single-item auction where the n bidders' values are independently and identically drawn from a regular distribution, the Vickrey auction with one additional bidder (a duplicate) extracts at least as much revenue as the optimal auction without the duplicate. Hartline and Roughgarden, in their influential 2009 paper, removed the requirement that the distributions be identical, at the cost of allowing the Vickrey auction to recruit n duplicates, one from each distribution, and relaxing its revenue advantage to a 2-approximation. In this work we restore Bulow and Klemperer's number of duplicates in Hartline and Roughgarden's more general setting. We show that recruiting a duplicate from one of the distributions suffices for the Vickrey auction to $10$-approximate the optimal revenue. We also show that in a k-unit auction, recruiting k duplicates suffices for the VCG auction to $O(1)$-approximate the optimal revenue. We also tighten the analysis for Hartline and Roughgarden's Vickrey auction with n duplicates. We show that, for two distributions, the Vickrey auction with two duplicates obtains at least $3/4$ of the optimal revenue. This is tight by meeting a lower bound by Hartline and Roughgarden. En route, we obtain a transparent analysis of their $2$-approximation, by a natural connection to Ronen's lookahead auction.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".