Immigration, individual autonomy, and social justice : an argument for a redistributive immigration policy
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Contemporary liberal democratic societies currently enact immigration policies that are morally indefensible from a liberal autonomy and social justice perspective. In a world characterized by stark inequalities in individual opportunities to lead autonomous lives, and in which many individuals lack the basic conditions for autonomous functioning, I argue that contemporary immigration regimes that distinguish between desirable immigrants---who are typically from similarly wealthy countries---and undesirable one ---who are typically members of the global poor---conflict with liberal commitments to individual autonomy and equality of opportunity. I advocate that such commitments should lead wealthy countries to change their criteria for immigration, so that they admit proportionally many more of the global poor than they currently do. Such redistributive immigration policies are a way for rich countries to fulfill their global distributive justice duties. The thesis examines two major objections to formulating immigration policies on grounds of global distributive justice. First, some theorists posit a moral distinction between compatriots and non-compatriots, and argue that duties of redistribution should be restricted to compatriots. Second, some theorists fear that redistributive immigration schemes will have negative consequences on the conditions of social justice in host communities. This fear derives from the assumptions that social solidarity and social trust will be eroded by the greater ethno-cultural heterogeneity that is likely to result from the implementation of redistributive immigration policies. In response I show, first, that social solidarity is not circumscribed by national boundaries; the empirical evidence does not support claims that solidaristic acts rely on a predefined idea of community. Second, drawing on the Canadian case study, I find that institutional trust rather than interpersonal trust is key to motivating compliance with social welfare policies, and that this kind of trust can be sustained under conditions of ethno-cultural heterogeneity.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".