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Record W2956034888 · doi:10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1705

Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?

2019· article· en· W2956034888 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Alan J. Kuperman

Bibliographic record

VenueGenocide Studies and Prevention · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicGlobal Peace and Security Dynamics
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersUnited States Institute of Peace
KeywordsGenocideCriminologyResponsibility to protectPolitical sciencePsychologyComputer securityComputer scienceLawHuman rights

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In the early 1990s, the relationship between genocidal violence and international humanitarian intervention was understood simplistically.Such intervention was viewed as always a response to, and never a cause of, inter-group violence.Well-intentioned intervention was expected reliably to reduce harm to civilians.Thus, the only obstacle to saving lives was believed to be inadequate political will for intervention.This quaint notion was popularized in mass-market books, 1 and it later gave rise to the "Responsibility to Protect" norm. 2 By the mid-1990s, however, scholars had discovered that the causal relationship between intervention and genocidal violence was more complicated.The prospect of intervention sometimes incentivized violence by parties expecting to attract intervention to help their side in a domestic struggle.For example, a relatively weak faction might launch a rebellion or armed secession to provoke a government crackdown, in hopes of triggering intervention to help them achieve independence or control of the state.Since the late 1990s, I have labeled this dynamic the "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention," 3 because the prospect of intervention is analogous to an imperfect insurance policy.It may backfire by encouraging irresponsible or fraudulent risk-taking, thereby increasing the likelihood of the negative outcome that the insurance was intended to avert.My publications have documented this dynamic in several cases, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur.4 Timothy Crawford rightly calls for specifying clearly the cause and effect of moral hazard in each case.5 The cause could be a diffuse norm of intervention, or previous intervention in a related instance, or a specific call for intervention in an ongoing situation.The effect could be the initiation of rebellion, or the escalation or perpetuation of an ongoing rebellion that otherwise might subside.The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention is not responsible for all initiation, escalation, and perpetuation of rebellion.Nor is rebellion the cause of all state violence against civilians.However, moral hazard has been demonstrated in several cases to incentivize rebellion and thereby foster escalatory violence that harms non-combatants.The scope of this pathology must be investigated to inform a rational reassessment and potential reform of the R2P.Accordingly, this article examines what role if any the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention played in Libya's 2011 rebellion that resulted in widespread and persistent suffering of civilians.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.024
Threshold uncertainty score0.060

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0060.003
Scholarly communication0.0040.002
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0180.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.025
GPT teacher head0.338
Teacher spread0.314 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designQualitative
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations8
Published2019
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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