Why Couldn’t You Just Keep Your Knees Together? L’obligation déontologique des juges face aux victimes de violences sexuelles (The Ethics of Judging Sexual Assault Cases)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
English Abstract: In recent years, high-profile cases have shed light on the behaviour of certain judges towards victims of sexual violence, thus undermining public confidence and victims’ confidence in the judicial system. Among these cases, there is the one of Judge Robin Camp who asked a victim: “why couldn’t you just keep your knees together?” This statement has had the effect of putting the spotlight on a section of the judiciary which still contributes to the myth of the “good victim” (or “perfect victim”). In this text, I argue that judges commit a breach of judicial ethics when they make a remark or a statement that (1) is likely to maintain the myth of the good victim, (2) participates in one of the four related stereotypes condemned in law and (3) is not justified by its relevance and necessity for legal reasoning. The article is divided into three parts. In Part I, I briefly describe the stereotypes covered by my proposal. It is limited to the four stereotypes that are part of the myth of the good victim and would constitute an error of law if they were the foundation of a legal reasoning. These four stereotypes are: (i) a sexually active woman is more inclined to consent and therefore less credible; (ii) a woman who does not report her attacker immediately after the assault is not credible; (iii) a woman who did not resist aggression surely consented; and (iv) a woman in therapy is more likely to lie. Legal reasoning based on any of these stereotypes would be affected by an error of law. In Part II, I discuss the legal basis of the ethical obligation not to promote the myth of the good victim. In Part III, I illustrate my proposition by reviewing the judgment of Justice William B. Horkins in R. v. Ghomeshi. French Abstract: L’actualite des dernieres annees a mis en lumiere le comportement problematique de plusieurs juges envers des victimes de violences sexuelles, minant leur confiance et celle du public envers le systeme judiciaire. Parmi certains des cas plus mediatises, on compte celui du juge Robin Camp qui avait demande a une victime : « why couldn’t you just keep your knees together? ». Voila qui a eu pour effet de mettre le projecteur sur une frange de la magistrature qui croit encore au mythe de la « bonne victime » (ou la « victime parfaite »). Dans ce texte, je soutiendrai qu’un ou une juge commet une faute deontologique lorsqu’il ou elle tient un propos (1) prompt a entretenir le mythe de la bonne victime, (2) qui participe d’un des quatre stereotypes afferents condamnes en droit et (3) qui n’est pas justifie par sa pertinence et sa necessite pour le raisonnement juridique. L’article se divise en trois parties. Dans la Partie 1, je detaille d’abord brievement les stereotypes vises par ma proposition. Celle-ci se limite aux quatre stereotypes fondant le mythe de la bonne victime qui ont ete condamnes en droit, c’est-a-dire qui constitueraient une erreur de droit s’ils fondaient un raisonnement juridique. Selon ces quatre stereotypes, (i) une femme sexuellement active est plus encline a consentir et serait moins credible; (ii) une femme qui ne denonce pas son agresseur immediatement apres l’agression est peu credible; (iii) une femme qui ne resiste pas a l’agression y avait surement consenti; et (iv) une femme en therapie est plus susceptible de mentir. Dans la Partie 2, j’aborde les fondements juridiques de l’obligation deontologique de ne pas entretenir ces stereotypes tout en identifiant deux limites a cette obligation. Le commentaire n’est fautif que s’il entretient un stereotype condamne en droit et que s’il n’est pas pertinent et necessaire au raisonnement juridique. Dans la Partie 3, enfin, j’illustrerai ma proposition en decortiquant les motifs du juge William B. Horkins dans R. v. Ghomeshi.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.008 | 0.017 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.010 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.008 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".