Bibliographic record
Abstract
Regardless of whether its mechanism is or warfare, military victory often depends on intangibles such as morale and will to fight Zimm crafts a model to explain how warfare targets those intangibles and triggers psychological results that are more decisive than physical ones. CURRENT US MARINE Corps doctrine dating from 1989 issue of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, espouses warfare.' Maneuver shatters the cohesion of system, achieving victory by paralyzing an enemy who has lost ability to resist. 2 This concept identifies as a weapon. The US Army concept of is less ambitious. Maneuver is relative to to put him at a disadvantage, wherein friendly forces gain ability to destroy or hinder his movement through direct or indirect application of lethal power or threat thereof.3 Victory is achieved through applying overwhelming combat power. These two contrasting concepts have been labeled as maneuver versus attrition or schools; merits of each have been extensively debated.4 Supporters cite historical examples in which their system of warfare resulted in victory. However, of outcome does not imply a similarity of process.' Military theorists struggle with a chicken and egg conundrum: destruction can cause panic and paralysis, and panic and paralysis facilitate destruction. Which is primary path to victory? On Victory History suggests that there are indeed two mechanisms-physical and moral-of victory: destroying or incapacitating opponent physically and destroying his will. In physical mechanism of victory, defeated side is annihilated. Cannae, Thermopylae, Fetterman massacre, Little Big Horn, Iwo Jima and Isandhlwana are examples. But in vast reach of history, examples of annihilation are mercifully few. Such battles are stuff of epics, and like epics, they are rare. Soldiers rarely fight to last man. Characteristically, they surrender, retreat or run in panic well before extermination. At Waterloo, French Army collapsed after Imperial Guard failed to break British line. Destruction had been widespread; French had already suffered about 15,000 casualties. But defeat came when remaining 60,000 no longer had will to stand. Some have noted that destruction and death are primary mechanisms to undermine morale and have concluded that firepower is sufficient for victory. But physical destruction is not only way to influence morale. While there are examples of resolving battles by annihilating physically, there are more examples of battles being resolved purely by destroying enemy's morale and will to fight During English King Henry V's campaign in France, [w]hen fall of Rouen became known, rest of Normandy quickly submitted. Often it was sufficient for Henry's captains to appear in front of a town or a castle for it to surrender.6 During War of Spanish Succession, many fortresses and fortified towns surrendered without a fight after Duke of Marlborough's spectacular victory at Ramillies.7 At sea it was common for warships to surrender to a more powerful opponent without exchanging a shot; confrontations were resolved with only threat of destruction. Perhaps most curious example of purely moral mechanism of victory is case of capitulating a full field army. At onset of War of 1812, Brigadier General William Hull ... withdrew to village of Detroit on 11 August Five days later, Major General Isaac Brock, British commander in Upper Canada, moved on Detroit with a much smaller force of regulars, militia and Indians. In a colossal bluff, he urged Hull to surrender, explaining that, once fighting commenced, he would be unable to control his Indians and a massacre might result. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.038 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".