Les dénonciations publiques d'agressions sexuelles : du mauvais usage de la présomption d’innocence ('Public Denunciation of Sexual Assault: Misunderstanding the Presumption of Innocence')
Bibliographic record
Abstract
French Abstract: Lorsqu’une victime denonce son agresseur sur la place publique, certaines personnes tentent de la reduire au silence en invoquant le droit a la presomption d’innocence. Ce fut particulierement evident en 2014, lors du mouvement #AgressionNonDenoncee ; ce le fut encore a l’automne 2015, alors que des femmes autochtones de Val-d’Or denoncaient les agressions sexuelles commises a leur endroit par des policiers ; ce le fut aussi en 2016 a l’occasion de la denonciation du depute Gerry Sklavounos par Alice Paquet ; et l’argument legaliste reapparait ainsi periodiquement sur la scene publique. Pourtant, peut-on vraiment bâillonner une victime en mettant de l’avant les droits de son agresseur ? L’auteur estime qu’il s’agit la d’un mauvais usage de la presomption d’innocence. Dans ce texte, il explique que la presomption d’innocence doit etre replacee dans son contexte juridique. Le droit a la presomption d’innocence est un principe fondamental qui protege les accuses contre le pouvoir punitif de l’Etat. Il trouve uniquement application dans le processus penal et n’est pas concu pour etre employe sur la scene publique. De plus, l’auteur explique que, dans le cadre du processus penal, la presomption d’innocence favorise la creation d’un espace de discussion ou les parties peuvent debattre de la culpabilite. Pourtant, lorsqu’elle est invoquee sur la scene publique, elle ne fait que placer les victimes dans un processus violent de remise en question de leur credibilite, tout en protegeant les agresseurs. Son invocation cree une atmosphere qui decourage les denonciations. Le debat public devie, laissant peu de place pour critiquer nos systemes de plaintes dysfonctionnels et la culture du viol. En ce sens, la presomption d’innocence n’est pas invoquee afin d’etablir un dialogue constructif, mais plutot pour faire taire les critiques. English Abstract: When a victim reports her aggressor publicly, some people try to silence her voice under the guise of the right to the presumption of innocence. This was especially remarkable in 2014, within the movement #AgressionNonDenoncee; and again in the fall of 2015, when Val-d’Or Indigenous women reported being sexually assaulted by police. It was also the case in 2016 when Alice Paquet denounced Member of Provincial Parliament Gerry Sklavounos, and the legal argument thus periodically reappears on the public stage. However, can we really silence a victim by advancing the rights of her aggressor? The author believes that this is a case of inappropriate use of the presumption of innocence. In this text, he explains that the presumption of innocence must be placed in its legal context. The right to the presumption of innocence is a principle that protects litigants against the punitive power of the state. Its sole application belongs in the criminal process, and it was not designed to be used as such on the public stage. In addition, the author explains that, at the heart of the criminal process, the presumption of innocence promotes the creation of a discussion space where all parties may debate the guilt. However, when it is invoked in the public sphere, it only places the victims in an aggressive process of questioning their credibility while protecting the aggressors. Its invocation creates a climate that deters denunciations of sexual assaults. The public debate deviates, leaving little room to criticize our dysfunctional complaint systems and rape culture. In that sense, the presumption of innocence is not invoked in order to establish a constructive dialogue, but it has the effect of shutting down its critics. In this article, the author explains why the right to the presumption of innocence must not be engaged in this way in the public sphere.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.018 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".