Informed seller problem : signaling, information design, and mechanism design
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This thesis studies an informed seller problem in which the seller tries to signal her private information through dierent channels-information disclosure, selling mechanism and return policy.Chapter 1 analyzes the signalling eect of information disclosure and price posting.Any separating equilibria must have the two types of seller setting dierent disclosure rules as well as dierent prices.Furthermore, the outcome that survives the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique.This equilibrium outcome is separating, for which a closed-form solution is provided.The signaling concern forces the high-type seller to disclose an ine cient amount of information and charge a higher price, resulting in fewer sales and lower prot.A regulation on minimal quality could potentially damage social welfare.In chapter 2, the seller is allowed to design a grand mechanism in which she herself participates in addition to information disclosure.The RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) mechanism is fully characterized, in which each type of seller separates at the lowest cost.In this mechanism, the low-type seller sells to the buyer with certainty and leaves zero surplus to the buyer.The high-type seller discloses to the buyer whether his value is above a cuto, sets a payment dierence equal to the conditional expected value, and provides a nonnegative bonus.Furthermore, the RSW mechanism can always be supported as a PBE and its outcome is the unique PBE outcome under certain conditions.Finally, the RSW mechanism always survives the Intuitive criterion, and is the unique one under certain conditions.Chapter 3 studies an second-price auction with return policies.It starts with binary type.In the separating equilibria, the high-type seller's return policy needs to be generous enough to deter the low-type seller from mimicking.Notably, a better return policy may not correspond to a better type.In the pooling equilibria, the return policy cannot be too generous.All separating equilibria have the same outcome and all survive Eso and Schummer's [24] credible deviation criterion while all pooling equilibria fail.Separation is costless and e cient.Similar results apply when sellers have multiple types.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".