Dynamic Game and Pricing for Data Sponsored 5G Systems With Memory Effect
Bibliographic record
Abstract
By enabling revenue sharing between the network operators and the sponsors, the sponsored data has been proven to be a promising solution and is becoming a ubiquitous trend in the fifth generation (5G) networks for improving data connectivity for the users, increasing mobile engagement for the sponsors, and ensuring revenue for the network operators. In this paper, we investigate the data sponsored 5G system on a long-run basis. Compared with the conventional dynamic, i.e., long-run, model, the users in the system are memory-affecting, i.e., the users' decision-making is affected by their past service experience. In the system under our consideration, the users decide on the communication service access by jointly taking into account their instantaneous achievable utility and the history of their service experience, e.g., the past improved utility corresponding to the data sponsorship. The 5G system works as the utility provider for managing the communication service. Specifically, by using the concept of the power-law fading memory and the classical evolutionary game theory, we formulate a population game to model and study the dynamic behaviors of the players in the data sponsored 5G system. In the game, the interaction among the memory-affecting rational users is formulated as a fractional evolutionary game, and the communication service management of the 5G system is formulated as a classical evolutionary game. We analytically prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the population game. We both analytically and numerically verify the stability of the solution. The performance evaluation shows some insightful results. For example, the data sponsorship can significantly increase the data consumption for the users when they are heavily memory-affecting. Following this, we study a data sponsorship pricing problem with the objective to maximize the data consumption at the expense of the minimal data sponsorship.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".