Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
One view regarding auction duration suggests that longer auctions would result in more bidders and more bids, which in turn would result in higher prices. An opposing view is that shorter auctions might appeal to impatient bidders, or alternatively, that shorter duration might lead to more competitive dynamics. To examine these competing notions, we conduct pairwise comparisons of simultaneous auctions identical in all but duration. The auctions are conducted on two different platforms—eBay and a local auction site. We find that in eBay auctions, longer duration increases the number of bidders and bids, and consequently increases final prices by about 11%. On the local auction website, with far fewer auctions and a more steady set of participants, the effect is reversed, and shorter auctions generate higher prices by about 20%. Both sets of effects are robust and significant. We look at bidding activity on both sites to try to get at the root of that reversal. We find that in eBay auctions, the higher price in the longer-duration auction is accompanied by a higher number of participating bidders and a higher number of bids placed in the auction. In the local site, we find that the auction duration does not significantly affect the number of participating bidders or the number of bids placed in an auction. However, the magnitude of jump bids is negatively and significantly correlated with duration. These jump bids are in turn shown to impact final prices.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it