Novos planos, velhos problemas: o positivismo jurídico de Scott Shapiro
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Since the publishing of Legality, Scott Shapiro's theory of law has been at the center of current jurisprudential debates. That theory is constructed around the claims that (1) laws are plans and that (2) legal activity is an activity of social planning. In this work I try to assess his oeuvre critically, using the idea of separation between law and morality, also known as separation thesis, as my conceptual lens. I explore the consequences of Shapiro's allegiance to that idea in two different theoretical levels. The first one is that of the foundations of law, while the second is that of legal practice. With regards to the first, I contend that Shapiro's reliance on the particular conception of rationality that goes along with planning, and that is defended by Michael Bratman, does not provide him with the philosophical tools he needs to give an adequate account of law's normativity. I point out that the puzzle he aims to solve is a moral one, and as such can only be solved through moral reasoning -reasoning of a kind that is not compatible with the notion that law and morality constitute two separate normative domains. That particular contention rules out conventionalism as a sound theory of law's normativity, even in its sophisticated Shapirian form. As for the second, I argue that a good theory of law must explain the phenomena dubbed by Ronald Dworkin as theoretical disagreements, and that Shapiro's positivism, in spite of its sophistication, cannot do that precisely because of its insistence on the separation thesis. I conclude that the only way to salvage Shapiro's theory is by amending its core commitments in order to transform it in an instance of normative positivism.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.004 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".