Le concept d’autonomie dans l’arrêt Carter c. Canada : Au-delà du libre-choix (The Concept of Autonomy in Carter v Canada: Beyond Free Choice)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
French Abstract: Quelle est la portee du droit a l’autonomie de la personne depuis l’arret Carter c. Canada ? L’arret a conclu que les dispositions du Code criminel qui prohibaient de facon absolue toute aide a mourir sont inconstitutionnelles en ce qu’elles portaient atteinte de facon injustifiee a l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes. La presente contribution analyse le concept d’autonomie qui sous-tend les motifs de la Cour. Dans un premier temps, les trois modeles theoriques d’« autonomie » reconnus en contexte biomedical et leurs fondements philosophiques seront decrits, a savoir l’autonomie ideale objective, l’autonomie ideale subjective et l’autonomie « non ideale » subjective (autrement qualifiee de « libre-choix »). Dans un deuxieme temps, nous demontrerons que le concept d’autonomie developpe dans Carter possede une veritable portee normative substantive correspondant aux principes philosophiques identifies. La definition du droit a la vie excluant un « droit a la mort » correspond a une norme universelle compatible avec un modele d’autonomie ideale objective. Lorsque l’autonomie est saisie sous le prisme de l’atteinte au droit a la liberte, c’est alors le modele de l’autonomie ideale subjective qui est retenu par les juges, lequel vise a permettre a un individu de se gouverner selon l’ensemble de ses valeurs et de ses convictions quant a la conduite generale de sa vie. En definitive, nous concluons que le concept d’autonomie tel que consacre par l’arret Carter revet une dimension normative dont le respect en pratique pourra – voire devra – justifier des exigences juridiques comme ethiques allant au-dela du simple « libre-choix ». English Abstract: What is the scope of the right to personal autonomy since Carter v. Canada? The case concluded that the provisions of the Criminal Code prohibiting assistance in dying are un-constitutional in that they unjustifiably in-fringe section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This article analyzes the concept of autonomy underpinning the Court’s reasons. First, the three theoretical models of “autonomy” recognized in the biomedical context and their philosophical foundations will be de-scribed. These models are objective ideal autonomy, subjective ideal autonomy, and subjective “non-ideal” autonomy (also called the “free choice” model). Second, we will demonstrate that the concept of autonomy developed in Carter carries a truly substantive normative scope corresponding to the philosophical principles identified above. The definition of the right to life as excluding a “right to die” corresponds to a universal norm compatible with a model of objective ideal autonomy. When autonomy is understood as an infringement to the right to freedom, the model of subjective ideal autonomy is that retained by judges. This model seeks to allow individuals to self-govern according to the values and convictions that guide the way they lead their life. We conclude that respecting the normative dimension of the concept of autonomy laid down in Carter may justify — if not demand — legal and ethical requirements going beyond simple notions of “free choice”.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.012 | 0.020 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".