Le droit de vote, la représentation effective et l’égalité des électeurs : de l’importance de prendre au sérieux un droit constitutionnel (The Right to Vote, Effective Representation, and Voters' Equality: On the Importance of Taking a Constitutional Right Seriously)

French Abstract: Cet article propose une relecture de l’arret Renvoi : circonscriptions electorales provinciales (Saskatchewan), [1991] 2 R.C.S. 158 (« Carter »)(I), en decryptant sa signification et sa portee a la lumiere de la jurisprudence subsequente de la Cour supreme du Canada (II). Il se penche ensuite sur les jugements des autres tribunaux judiciaires ayant interprete le cadre analytique mis en place par la Cour supreme (III), en s’attardant aux enjeux particuliers que soulevent la representation des circonscriptions rurales et la protection des minorites. Enfin, il revient sur le role des tribunaux lorsqu’ils sont appeles a intervenir au regard des processus electoraux (IV). L’auteur y soutient a cet egard que si une certaine deference judiciaire peut se justifier, cette deference ne saurait mener les tribunaux a abdiquer leur responsabilite de donner effet aux prescriptions de la Constitution du Canada. La deference judiciaire ne devrait jamais les induire a rendre fonctionnellement non justiciables des droits constitutionnels poses comme justiciables. English Abstract: As an attribute of citizenship, the right to vote - which is a justiciable right - must be taken seriously, to borrow Dworkin's formulation, and it is not clear that it is always the case in Canada under the regime governed by the 1991 Carter case. While the analytical framework focussing on the voters' effective representation allows for certain derogations to the principle of equal representation, such derogations must remain exceptional and must be justifiable. Their multiplication, as well as their broad scope, may reveal unconstitutional restriction to the right to vote, in addition to raising serious questions about the fate of equal citizenship which is consubstantial to the idea of democracy. The author argues that the reconciliation of the legitimate concerns of all citizens-voters should not become a zero-sum game where some systematically win, and the other lose. An electoral system which allows this to happen is a self-corroding one. The author revisits the Carter case in light of the subsequent case law from the Supreme Court of Canada, after which he examines the interpretation that lower courts have given of it, with a specific focus on how questions pertaining to the protection of minorities were treated. Last, he considers the role that courts are called upon to play in electoral processes, arguing that although judicial deference may be justified in some circumstances, it cannot, and should not, lead courts to abdicate their responsibility of upholding constitutional rights. Legitimate concerns for judicial deference should never have the effect of inducing courts to functionally transform justiciable rights into non-justiciables ones.

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