Tax Audits and Procedural Fairness: The Role of The Tax Auditor (Vérification fiscale et équité procédurale: rôle du vérificateur fiscal)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
English Abstract: In 2013, in the Groupe Enico inc. case, the Superior Court judge stated that a decision-maker cannot have an interest in the decision he makes, and that consequently the role of a tax auditor is incompatible with a mechanism of allowances or bonuses on recovery. In 2016, the Court of Appeal of Quebec did not appear to be in agreement with that statement. This paper does not address the issue of the existence of such a mechanism. Its sole purpose is to answer the following theoretical and purely legal question: if they existed, would premiums based on auditors' ability to collect taxes raise issues of impartiality and conflict of interests in administrative law? The author will focus on the decision-making role of a tax auditor in the use of his auditing powers. French Abstract: En 2013, dans l’affaire Groupe Enico inc. c. Agence du revenu du Quebec, le juge de la Cour superieure avait indique qu’« [u]n decideur ne peut avoir d’interet dans la decision qu’il rend » et que le role d’un verificateur d’impot etait donc incompatible avec un mecanisme de primes basees sur des objectifs de recuperation ou de rendement. En 2016, la Cour d’appel du Quebec n’a pas semble approuver cette position. Cet article ne vise pas a determiner si de telles primes existent ou non, mais a repondre a la question theorique et purement juridique suivante : si de telles primes existaient, souleveraient-elles des questions d’impartialite et de conflit d’interets en droit administratif? L’auteur se concentre sur le role de decideur du verificateur fiscal, dans le cadre de l’utilisation de ses pouvoirs de verification.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.020 | 0.036 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.014 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".