The frequency of say-on-pay vote, shareholder value, and corporate governance
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Using a sample of 1,079 public firms listed on the U.S. stock market that filed the results of their frequency votes in 2011, we examine the market reaction to shareholders’ decision on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote, and the relation between such decision and firms’ existing corporate governance structures. When firms release the results of their shareholders’ frequency vote in Form 8-K, we find that market reaction was significantly positive for firms with excess CEO equity pay, and for firms whose shareholders’ preference for the frequency is the same as that recommended by the board. This positive market reaction is more pronounced for firms where shareholders change the recommendations of the boards by demanding more frequent votes on executive compensation. Overall, our study on the frequency of votes provides new insights that are different from prior studies, which mostly focus on say-on-pay votes. We show that the market perceives the shareholders’ frequency vote as a value-increasing governance mechanism and a complement to the existing corporate governance
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it