Bibliographic record
Abstract
Evidence suggests that the negotiated wage for a unionized employee group is an increasing function of the firm's prior profitability.As a result, managers may have an incentive to strategically signal a negative outlook to their unionized workers in order to improve the firm's bargaining position.I assess the strategy of missing mean consensus analysts' earnings estimates as a way for managers to signal a negative outlook to their unionized employees.I find that unionized firms are more likely to miss estimates than their nonunionized counterparts.Additionally, this propensity to miss estimates is increasing in both the firm's percentage of unionized employees and multiunionism, but is unaffected by the timing of the signal relative to contract renewal.Finally, the increased propensity to miss estimates appears to be driven by both differences in expectations management and earnings management across the two groups.Specifically, managers of unionized firms take less action than their nonunionized counterparts to guide forecasts downward when estimates are too high, and they take more action to deflate earnings when expectations are too low.Taken together, the findings suggest that managers do seek to project a negative outlook to their unions, and that this tendency is increasing in the union's negotiation strength.The full text of this paper begins on p. 14 of this issue. Motivation des syndicats et des dirigeants a assombrir les perspectives FRANCESCO BOVALes faits semblent indiquer que le salaire n egoci e d'un groupe d'employ es syndiqu es est une fonction croissante de la rentabilit e pr ealable de l'entreprise.Les dirigeants peuvent donc être motiv es a assombrir les perspectives aux yeux de leurs employ es syndiqu es a des fins strat egiques, afin d'am eliorer la position de n egociation de l'entreprise.L'auteur evalue la strat egie consistant pour les dirigeants a maintenir les r esultats en dec ß a des estimations consensuelles moyennes des analystes pour assombrir les perspectives aux yeux des employ es syndiqu es.Il constate que les entreprises dont les employ es sont syndiqu es sont davantage susceptibles de recourir a cette strat egie que les entreprises dont les employ es ne sont pas syndiqu es.De plus, cette propension a maintenir les r esultats en dec ß a des estimations augmente aussi bien avec le pourcentage d'employ es syndiqu es des entreprises qu'avec la multiplicit e des syndicats, mais elle n'est pas touch ee par le moment o u la strat egie est mise en œuvre par rapport au renouvellement du contrat.Enfin, la propension accrue a maintenir les r esultats en dec ß a des estimations semble s'expliquer par les diff erences tant dans la gestion des attentes que dans la gestion du r esultat, dans les deux groupes.Plus pr ecis ement, les dirigeants d'entreprises dont les employ es sont syndiqu es interviennent moins que leurs homologues des entreprises dont les employ es ne sont pas syndiqu es pour orienter les pr evisions a la baisse (gestion des attentes) lorsque les estimations sont trop elev ees, et ils interviennent davantage pour diminuer les r esultats (gestion du r esultat) lorsque les attentes sont trop faibles.Ces constatations r eunies semblent indiquer que les dirigeants cherchent a assombrir les perspectives aux yeux des syndicats et que cette tendance augmente avec le pouvoir de n egociation des syndicats.La version int egrale anglaise de l'article qui pr ec ede commence a la page 14 du pr esent num ero.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.689 | 0.559 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; the direct Gemma label and the distilled Codex classifier agree on what is shown here.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".