COVID-19 malicious domain names classification
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Due to the rapid technological advances that have been made over the years, more people are changing their way of living from traditional ways of doing business to those featuring greater use of electronic resources. This transition has attracted (and continues to attract) the attention of cybercriminals, referred to in this article as "attackers", who make use of the structure of the Internet to commit cybercrimes, such as phishing, in order to trick users into revealing sensitive data, including personal information, banking and credit card details, IDs, passwords, and more important information via replicas of legitimate websites of trusted organizations. In our digital society, the COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented situation. As a result, many individuals were left vulnerable to cyberattacks while attempting to gather credible information about this alarming situation. Unfortunately, by taking advantage of this situation, specific attacks associated with the pandemic dramatically increased. Regrettably, cyberattacks do not appear to be abating. For this reason, cyber-security corporations and researchers must constantly develop effective and innovative solutions to tackle this growing issue. Although several anti-phishing approaches are already in use, such as the use of blacklists, visuals, heuristics, and other protective solutions, they cannot efficiently prevent imminent phishing attacks. In this paper, we propose machine learning models that use a limited number of features to classify COVID-19-related domain names as either malicious or legitimate. Our primary results show that a small set of carefully extracted lexical features, from domain names, can allow models to yield high scores; additionally, the number of subdomain levels as a feature can have a large influence on the predictions.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.004 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".