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Record W4282024669 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4392

Addictive Platforms

2022· article· en· W4282024669 on OpenAlexaff
Shota Ichihashi, Byung‐Cheol Kim

Bibliographic record

VenueManagement Science · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicDigital Platforms and Economics
Canadian institutionsBank of CanadaQueen's University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCompetition (biology)HarmBusinessIncentiveService (business)Quality (philosophy)MarketingMicroeconomicsEconomicsPsychology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study competition for consumer attention in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the “addictiveness” of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating attention. We provide conditions under which increased competition can harm consumers by encouraging platforms to offer low-quality services. In particular, if attention is scarce, increased competition reduces the quality of services because business-stealing incentives induce platforms to increase addictiveness. Restricting consumers’ platform usage may decrease addictiveness and improve consumer welfare. A platform’s ability to charge for its service can also decrease addictiveness. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.692
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.007
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.012
GPT teacher head0.185
Teacher spread0.174 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations23
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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