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Record W4285798199 · doi:10.1145/3499428

CDNs’ Dark Side: Security Problems in CDN-to-Origin Connections

2022· article· en· W4285798199 on OpenAlexaff
Behnam Shobiri, Mohammad Mannan, Amr Youssef

Bibliographic record

VenueDigital Threats Research and Practice · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicSpam and Phishing Detection
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceMan-in-the-middle attackComputer securityTransport Layer SecurityCertificateDenial-of-service attackLightweight Directory Access ProtocolEnd userThe InternetServerInternet accessWorld Wide WebComputer networkAuthentication (law)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) play a vital role in today’s Internet ecosystem. To reduce the latency of loading a website’s content, CDNs deploy edge servers in different geographic locations. CDN providers also offer important security features including protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Web Application Firewalls (WAFs), and recently, issuing and managing certificates for their customers. Many popular websites use CDNs to benefit from both the security and the performance advantages. For HTTPS websites, Transport Layer Security (TLS) security choices may differ in the connections between end-users and a CDN (front-end or user-to-CDN), and between the CDN and the origin server (back-end or CDN-to-Origin). Modern browsers can stop/warn users if weak or insecure TLS/HTTPS options are used in the front-end connections. However, such problems in the back-end connections are not visible to browsers or end-users, and lead to serious security issues (e.g., not validating the certificate can lead to MitM attacks). In this article, we primarily analyze TLS/HTTPS security issues in the back-end communication; such issues include inadequate certificate validation and support for vulnerable TLS configurations. We develop a test framework and investigate the back-end connection of 14 leading CDNs (including Cloudflare, Microsoft Azure, Amazon, and Fastly), where we could create an account. Surprisingly, for all the 14 CDNs, we found that the back-end TLS connections are vulnerable to security issues prevented/warned by modern browsers; examples include failing to validate the origin server’s certificate, and using insecure cipher suites such as RC4, MD5, SHA-1, and even allowing plain HTTP connections to the origin. We also identified 168,795 websites in the Alexa top 1 million that are potentially vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks in their back-end connections regardless of the origin/CDN configurations chosen by the origin owner.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.023
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.011
Threshold uncertainty score0.029

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.023
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0030.004
Scholarly communication0.0030.009
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.130
GPT teacher head0.397
Teacher spread0.267 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations11
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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