Deep Fake Detection, Deterrence and Response: Challenges and Opportunities
Bibliographic record
Abstract
According to the 2020 cyber threat defence report, 78% of Canadian organizations experienced at least one successful cyberattack in 2020. The consequences of such attacks vary from privacy compromises to immersing damage costs for individuals, companies, and countries. Specialists predict that the global loss from cybercrime will reach 10.5 trillion US dollars annually by 2025. Given such alarming statistics, the need to prevent and predict cyberattacks is as high as ever. Our increasing reliance on Machine Learning(ML)-based systems raises serious concerns about the security and safety of these systems. Especially the emergence of powerful ML techniques to generate fake visual, textual, or audio content with a high potential to deceive humans raised serious ethical concerns. These artificially crafted deceiving videos, images, audio, or texts are known as Deepfakes garnered attention for their potential use in creating fake news, hoaxes, revenge porn, and financial fraud. Diversity and the widespread of deepfakes made their timely detection a significant challenge. In this paper, we first offer background information and a review of previous works on the detection and deterrence of deepfakes. Afterward, we offer a solution that is capable of 1) making our AI systems robust against deepfakes during development and deployment phases; 2) detecting video, image, audio, and textual deepfakes; 3) identifying deepfakes that bypass detection (deepfake hunting); 4) leveraging available intelligence for timely identification of deepfake campaigns launched by state-sponsored hacking teams; 5) conducting in-depth forensic analysis of identified deepfake payloads. Our solution would address important elements of the Canada National Cyber Security Action Plan(2019-2024) in increasing the trustworthiness of our critical services.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".